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Professor Prosser in his excellent text on torts observed: "There
is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that
which surrounds the word 'nuisance.' "1 The lengthy decision in
the recent case Devoke v. Yazoo and Mississippi Valley Railroad
Company2 did little to dissipate this confusion as to the nature of
nuisance. The court, however, did make clear the fact that an
annoyance arising from the use of neighboring land may be action-
able without a showing of the kind of mismanagement or fault
that is characteristic of the average negligence case. This is in line
with the course of decisions both here in Louisiana and elsewhere.3
The opinion, however, relies upon an observation to the effect that
nuisance cases imposing liability without fault are sui generis and
that they differ in kind from torts controversies. This can serve only
to confuse an area of the law that is in drastic need of illumination.
This is no place to launch into a diatribe on the relationship
between fault and tort liability, although it is appropriate to observe
that moralistic theology (of which the dogma of fault is likely to
be regarded as a part) furnishes a thoroughly inadequate approach
to the balancing processes that the courts must effect in the vast
field of conflicting social and economic interests that parade under
the name of torts. The term, fault, may, of course, be expanded
until it is synonymous with "common sense" or "intuitive feeling."4
When so used it is still a useful tool in our legal vocabulary. It
describes the tilt of the scale in balancing the interests involved
without committing the judge for the future. Nevertheless, the
term, fault, because of its moralistic connotation does sometimes
force the court into an embarrassing corner, as in the present case.
Even if the language of morals is essential, the average nuisance
cases are thoroughly in line with such an approach. The facts of
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Prosser. A Handbook of the Law of Torts (1941) 549.
2. 211 La. 729, 80 So. (2d) 816 (1947). See also O'Neal v. Southern Carbon
Co., 31 So. (2d) 216 (La. 1947).
8. Friedmann, Negligence and the Overlapping of Torts (1940) 8 Modern L.
lRev. 305; Smith, Reasonable Use as Justification of Damage to a Neighbor
(1917) 17 Col L. Rev. 393.
4. See, for example, the excellent treatment in Stone, Tort Doctrine in Lou-
isiana: The Materials for the Decision of a Case (1942) 17 Tulane L. Rev. 159,
213-215.
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the Devoke case, itself, afford an ideal illustration. For many years
the defendant railroad had deposited smoke and soot on adjoining
property despite the long continued protest of neighboring home
owners, who had even secured an injunction as far back as 1910.
This was an intentional wrong-the doing of an act with full knowl-
edge that the consequences were injurious to other persons. The
fact that there was no desire to hurt is quite immaterial. The
defendant simply answers that his purposes were more important
than the interests of his neighbors, and the court is thus required to
balance the conflicting claims.5
This balancing of claims is what is done in every torts contro-
versy. If I should enter on your property to recapture my lost golf
ball, my defense is the asserted privilege that my purpose to regain
my property is more important than your interest in having your
land free from invasion. The court may or may not agree with me,
but our controversy is nevertheless over a tort. The same is true of
the present nuisance case; the defendant sends his smoke across
the border and claims the privilege of doing so because running
railroads is so valuable to society that the neighbors must suffer their
loss without redress, even though defendant knows he is injuring
them and he proposes to continue doing so. The court's problem
is to weigh the conflicting needs of society and give its answer. The
notion that we must find a "bad man" lurking in the woodpile
before we can call this area "tortious" is entirely too narrow as a
working premise.
In Borgnemouth Realty Company v. Gulf Soap Corporation6
the court was faced with the demand that an injunction and dam-
ages be granted the owners of residential property against a render-
ing establishment in the neighborhood that was emitting nauseous
fumes. The court concluded that the plant was a nuisance in view
of the place of its location and the manner of its operation. In
passing it observed that a rendering plant is not a nuisance per se
(or an absolute nuisance), and, if relief were to be allowed, it would
be obliged to balance the conveniences and burdens attendant upon
the particular situation.
The position of the court in refusing to outlaw arbitrarily a
rendering plant is commendable. The concept of an absolute nuis-
ance has little, if any, validity. It is, in practice, restricted to two
types of situations: first, where the legislature has outlawed the
5. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 1, at 554.
6. 31 So. (2d) 488 (La. 1947).
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business of defendant, at least insofar as it may be conducted in
urban areas; second, certain activities which are nearly everywhere
required to pay their own way (such as the storage of explosives or
the conduct of blasting operations). In both classes the balance of
claims has been made in advance either by the legislature or by an
established course of judicial decision.
The idea that one landowner's interests are so valuable that his
neighbor's use of his own property will be precluded without any
effort to strike a balance between the two has proved too costly;
and resort is usually made to such terms of compromise as "negli-
gence," "reasonable use," et cetera. Only in the field of surface
waters is there a remaining tendency to solve all disputes between
neighboring landowners in advance through the use of crystallized
rules that give one contestant an arbitrary priority over the other.
Even there the courts in this country are sharply divided as to
whether the defendant may make an unrestricted use of waters,7
or, at the other extreme, is entirely precluded from interfering with
the natural flow.' It has been observed that neither position repre-
sents a healthy state of law, and the doctrine- of reasonable user is
coming into increasing favor even in these contests.'
Negligence and Absolute Liability
Our supreme court has confirmed again its determination to
hold those who traffic in explosive substances to a high degree of
responsibility. Although cases against these defendants parade under
the banner of negligence, they reflect an insurer's liability. Some-
times the judgment is supported by resort to res ipsa loquitur, and
an inference of "negligence" is readily drawn from the mere occur-
rence of the accident. This inference, the unhappy defendant dis-
covers, is virtually impossible of rebuttal.1"
The most recent instance of the use of res ipsa loquitur in im-
posing liability against the purveyor of gas is Hake v. Air Reduction
Sales Company.1 Defendant supplied carbide gas in containers for
7. This is the so-called "common enemy" or "common law" rule, although
there is little evidence that such a rule has ever prevailed in England. Kinyon
and McClure, Surface Waters (1940) 24 Minn. L. Rev. 891.
8. This is the so-called "civil law" rule which prevails in many American
jurisdictions. Cf. Art. 660, La. Civil Code of 1870. Kinyon and McClure, supra
note 7.
9. Kinyon and McClure, supra note 7.
10. Symposium, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1944-1945
Term, Torts and Workmen's Compensation (1946) 6 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 601;
Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference-A Discussion of the Lou-
isiana Cases (1941) 4 LOUIsIANA LAW REVIEW 70, 95.
11. 210 La. 810, 28 So. (2d) 441 (1946).
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use in plaintiff's business. For some unexplained reason, gas escaped
from the top of one container and ignited the plaintiff's establish-
ment, which was destroyed by the resulting fire. The plaintiff re-
ceived a judgment for more than thirty-five thousand dollars despite
defendant's showing that the cylinder in question conformed with
the safety regulations of the National Board of Fire Underwriters
and the introduction of evidence of an inspection just prior to the
release of the container to plaintiff. The only positive evidence upon
which plaintiff could rely was the fact that the container was
twenty years old. Plaintiff did not, however, attempt to show that
this fact made the container dangerous nor that containers of that
age are not in current usage. Typical of this sort of case, however,
the plaintiff did negative its own carelessness, and thus succeeded
in pointing an accusing finger directly at defendant. The court had
no difficulty in disposing of the contention that defendant was not
in control of the cylinder at the time of the accident.12
The disposition to hold those who deal in gas and other explo-
sive substances is made all the firmer where the hazard affects
those who use the public highways. Thus, in the recent case, Raphael
Brothers v. Cerophyl Laboratories," the court had no difficulty in
imposing liability despite the rather unusual nature of the accident.
The defendant ran a pipe containing gas along a ditch adjacent to
a public road. This pipe made a turn and crossed under the road
at a place where there was a narrow culvert over a shallow ditch.
Plaintiff's truck ran off the edge of the culvert and onto the pipe,
breaking it. The gas which was thus caused to escape was ignited
in some manner, and the resulting conflagration destroyed the plain-
tiff's truck. The defendant's reliance on the unforeseeable nature of
this kind of occurrence and the high speed at which the truck was
allegedly being driven served to no avail.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The distinction between employee and contractor has long
afforded ground for dispute in compensation cases. Several of the
earliest decisions manifested an obvious disposition toward regard-
ing the claimant as a contractor in all doubtful situations. 4 In an
effort to liberalize the courts' attitude and perhaps also in the hope
of relieving the prevailing uncertainty, the legislature of 1926
12. Cf. Motor Sales & Services, Inc. v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 131 So. 623
(La. App. 1980), noted in (1931) 4 So. Calif. L. Rev. 400.
13. 211 La. 354, 30 So. (2d) 116 (1947).
14. Clark v. Tall Timber Lumber Co., 140 La. 380, 73 So. 239 (1916); Ryland
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amended the act by supplying a definition of the term "independent
contractor" as follows:
"The term 'independent contractor' shall be considered to
mean, for the purpose of this act, any person who renders
service, other than manual labor, for a specified recompense for
a specified result either as a unit or as a whole, under the con-
trol of his principal as to the result of his work only, and not
as to the means by which such result is accomplished." (Italics
supplied.)5
This legislative intervention proved to be unnecessary. Even
before 1926 the tide of sentiment had turned. Early unfortunate
decisions such as Helton v. Tall Timber Lumber Company"8 were
abandoned, and a more liberal attitude (manifested by Bell v. Albert
Hanson Lumber Company," Dick v. Gravel Logging Company,8
and Burt v. Davis Wood Lumber Company1") was adopted. The
general language of the amendment did not materially affect the
course of decision, and it was generally regarded as merely declara-
tory of the state of the jurisprudence being developed at that time.2"
One aspect of the 1926 amendment, however, has been a source
of chronic trouble. The legislature seems to have excluded any person
who renders manual labor from the term "independent contractor."
This restriction, if put into indiscriminate operation by the court,
would virtually eliminate the concept of independent contractor
from the picture.2'
Fortunately, the first case in which this feature of the amend-
ment was urged upon the court (Clements v. Luby Oil Company22)
was one where nearly every indicia pointed clearly to the status of
contractor. Complainant was a member of a partnership in the
regular business of making derricks. The firm employed a crew of
workers, and on the occasion in question it had made a lump sum
contract to construct a derrick for defendant out of material furn-
ished by the latter. In view of the fact that complainant performed
v. Harve M. Wheeler Lumber Co., 146 La. 787, 84 So. 55 (1919); Helton v. Tal
Timber Lumber Co. of Louisiana, Inc., 148 La. 180, 86 So. 729 (1920).
15. La. Act 58 of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4392 et seq.] ; La. Act 20 of
1914, § 3, Par. 8, as amended.
16. 148 La. 180, 86 So. 729 (1920).
17. 151 La. 824, 92 So. 350 (1922).
18. 152 La. 993, 95 So. 99 (1922).
19. 157 La. 111, 102 So. 87 (1924).
20. See James v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Edwards, Inc., 180 So. 257, 258 (La. App.
1930).
21. See Cobb v. Long Bell Lumber Co., 134 So. 310, 812 (La. App. 1981).
22. 125 So. 510 (La. App. 1929), reversed 170 La. 910, 129 So. 526 (1930).
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the work personally the court of appeal felt constrained by 'the
amendment to regard him as an employee. This was reversed on
appeal. The supreme court pointed out that so long as the contract
does not specifically require the doing of manual work by the com-
plainant himself, the fact that he performs the labor is only one
consideration in determining his status. That position has been
subseqently confirmed in several decisions.'
The most recent case is Allgood v. Loeb. 4 The facts of the All-
good case were strikingly similar to those of an earlier court of ap-
peal decision, Heine v. Hill-Harris & Company, Incorporated.5
Complainant and his brother were regularly employed by the Hig-
gins Industries as carpenters. During their spare time they installed
siding on dwellings for the defendant, a building contractor. Every
indicia pointed to the status of contractor for Allgood. He was given
exclusive rights with reference to each dwelling upon which he
worked. No supervision was exercised, and the job was inspected
only for the purpose of seeing that the completed work conformed
with the contract. Allgood worked at such times as he chose and
he was free to employ helpers if he wished. Most important, per-
haps, was the fact that he agreed to correct all defective work with-
out cost to defendant.
Nevertheless, it was insisted by counsel for defendant (who was
seeking to escape tort liability) that since Allgood performed work
himself, he must perforce be regarded as an employee at least to
the extent that manual labor entered into the services performed.
The majority opinion rejected this contention and reasserted the
position first adopted in the Clements case. This decision makes
clear that the courts are determined to reject any interpretation of
the 1926 amendment that would encroach upon their prerogative
of handling each situation on an individual basis. Strangely enough,
Clements v. Luby Oil Company, which is generally regarded as the
leading case on this problem, was not cited. There is a dissenting
opinion by Justice Hawthorne.
There is no need here for another thrashing of old straw on the
conflicting provision of Section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act. It is well known that at one time the provision for specific
23. Cobb v. Long Bell Lumber Co., 184 So. 810 (La. App. 1931); Myers v.
Newport Co., 185 So. 767 (La. App. 1931); Harris v. Louisiana Oil Refining
Corp., 187 So. 598 (La. App. 1981); Rodgers v. City of Hammond, 178 So. 782
(La. App. 1938).
24. 210 La. 594, 27 So. (2d) 880 (1946), reversing 22 So. (2d) 568 (La. App.
1945).
25. 2 La. App. 884 (1925).
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enumerated injuries [Section 8-1-(d)] prevailed over the general
provisions for total and partial disability [Section 8-1-(a), (b),
(c)]."' Preliminary evidence suggesting dissatisfaction with this
approach is found as early as 1926,2" but it was not until Knispel v.
Gulf States Utilities" in 1932 that we find a clearly marked disposi-
tion to regard the listed specific injuries as being compensable as
partial or total disability. Even the Knispel case might be distin-
guished on the peculiar facts involved. For several years thereafter
the proper resolution of the conflict was a subject of considerable
speculation. 9 Despite clarifying statements in McGruder v. Service
Drayage Company"0 and Barr v. Davis Brothers Lumber Company,8
the matter was not conclusively settled by the supreme court until
1940 in Robichaux v. Realty Operators.32 In that case Chief Justice
O'Niell, who had dissented both in the McGruder and the Barr case
felt constrained to remark: "The writer of this opinion dissented
from the decision in those cases but has concluded now to yield to
the majority opinion."3
Last year the court of appeal for the second circuit was con-
fronted with a situation where a helper on an ice truck sustained
an injury which necessitated the amputation of his hand just above
the wrist. It allowed compensation for the loss of the hand, based
upon the schedule in Paragraph (d). The decision noted that com-
plainant "should be able to do a number of things classified as
common labor. He might still perform the same kind of work he
was doing at the time he was injured, though it would be more
difficult for him." 4 Thus the argument was pitched on the dispute
as to when is a common laborer totally disabled? The supreme
court annulled the decision of the court of appeal " and reaffirmed
the test used in the recent case, Henry v. Higgins Industries"S:
Was he able to compete with other able bodied laborers in securing
employment? The mere positing of the problem, thus broadly
phrased, suggests the answer.
26. James v. Spence & Goldstein, 161 La. 1108, 109 So. 917 (1926). Cf. Nor-
wood v. Lake Bisteneau Oil Co., 145 La. 828, 83 So. 25 (1919).
27. See Black v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 161 La. 889, 109 So. 588
(1926).
28. 174 La. 401, 141 So. 9 (1982).
29. Mayer, Workmen's Compensation Law in Louisiana (1987) 85-96.
80. 188 La. 75, 162 So. 806 (1935).
31. 183 La. 1013, 165 So. 185 (1985).
82. 195 La. 70, 196 So. 23 (1940).
83. 195 La. 70, 80, 196 So. 28, 27.
34. Washington v. Independent Ice & Cold Storage Co., 29 So. (2d) 796, 799
(La. App. 1946).
35. Washington v. Independent Ice & Cold Storage Co., 211 La. 690, 80 So.
(2d) 758 (1947).
86. 24 So. (2d) 402, 404 (La. App. 1946).
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